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Abstract 
With the increasing maturity of the cloud computing market, specifically in the Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) domain, adequate pricing of services has become a crucial success factor for providers. In this 
work, we take a threefold approach to examine the current situation concerning pricing in the IaaS mar-
ket. Based on an initial literature review, we find that pay-as-you-go pricing is perceived as the dominant 
scheme by the scientific community. Based on this notion, we discuss other pricing schemes with respect 
to their advantages, disadvantages, and challenges for a cloud provider. These results are complemented 
by an empirical study, in which we identify pay-as-you-go and subscription pricing as the dominant op-
tions that are practically applied in the IaaS market today. 
KEYWORDS 
Cloud computing, infrastructure, IaaS, pricing, scheme, mechanism, analytical, empirical, study, exami-
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Introduction 
The idea to centrally and dynamically provision IT services via (public) networks – that is, the quintes-
sence of cloud computing – is not an invention of modern times, but already saw it practical realization in 
the mainframe-oriented time-sharing models of the 1960s (Cusumano, 2010). Yet, the following decades 
rather brought along a decentralization of IT with the widespread deployment of personal computers, 
both in business and private life. Since the beginning of the new millennium, this trend has reversed once 
again, marked by buzzwords such as application service providing – which can be seen as a predecessor of 
today’s Software as a Service offers (Weinhardt et al., 2009) – and thin clients, finally cumulating in the 
concept of “cloud computing”. 
Through the use of new technologies, most notably virtualization, cloud computing permits the pooling of 
resources, and hence, the flexible, cost-efficient provision of IT capacities. While Amazon with its Amazon 
Web Services can arguably be seen as a pioneer of the industry (Qian et al., 2009), numerous providers 
have entered the market in recent years. Hence, with increasing competition among providers, an ade-
quate pricing for cloud services has become a crucial success factor. This specifically applies for Infra-
structure as a Service (IaaS) offers such as Virtual Machines (VMs) and storage, which are characterized 
by increasing standardization and thus, limited lock-in effects and high substitutability. 
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Based on this notion, we examine the issue of pricing in infrastructure clouds in this paper. In this con-
text, we strive to answer the following research questions: 
1. What is literature view on pricing in cloud computing and specifically, IaaS? 
2. What are the theoretic pros and cons of selected pricing mechanism from the standpoint of an 
IaaS provider? 
3. Which pricing mechanisms are practically applied in the IaaS market today? 
We believe that the results of our work can be of interest to both researchers and practitioners in the area 
of cloud computing. Notably, for fellow scientist, this paper provides a consolidated overview of the cur-
rent literature view on cloud pricing and an empirical “reality check” of the main results. Furthermore, 
our work can aid (prospective) cloud providers in the selection of an adequate pricing mechanism and 
offers them a broad impression of the current market situation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the following section, we discuss the scientific 
view on pricing in IaaS clouds, based on a literature review. Subsequently, we discuss a selected set of 
popular pricing mechanisms with respect to their theoretical applicability for cloud-based infrastructure 
services. As a complement to these analytical findings, we present the results of a quantitative study in the 
IaaS market. The paper closes with conclusions. 
Literature View on Cloud Pricing 
In the first part of our research, we aimed to identify the literature view on cloud pricing. For that pur-
pose, we identified a set of recent papers that deal with cloud computing and make explicit statements on 
the pricing aspect. In this process, we used the Google Scholar scientific search engine as a starting point 
and identified further relevant papers based on our initial results. In the search process, we used a combi-
nation of terms such as “cloud”, “cloud computing”, “definition”, “pay”, “payment”, and “pricing”.  
We focused on papers that had received at least 50 citations as of October 2013 according to Google 
Scholar. These contributions can be considered to have had significant impact on the perception and un-
derstanding of cloud computing within the scientific community. While other metrics, such the corre-
sponding outlet’s impact factor or ranking, may have also been considered in the selection process, we 
believe that the number of citations constitutes the most obvious and direct measure of an individual pa-
per’s relevance. 
Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that our approach, which is based on the previously described 
Google Scholar search, has potential limitations: First, Google Scholar’s index may be incomplete, both 
with respect to the indexed papers and the indexed citations; second, our search terms may be inadequate 
to identify all papers that are potentially of interest to the specific research question.  
Table 1 summarizes the results of our literature review, listing a set of 17 scientific sources and the respec-
tive statements on cloud pricing. As can be clearly seen, there appears to be a consensus within the scien-
tific community that cloud services are priced using a “pay-as-you-go” (or “pay-per-use”) scheme, i.e., that 
users are charged costs that linearly increase with their respective resource utilization.  
Table 1: View on pricing in cloud computing in the scientific literature 
Source Statement on pricing 
Armbrust et al., 2009 “…made available in a pay-as-you-go manner to the general public…” 
Buyya et al., 2009 “Consumers are then able to pay service providers based on their usage of these utility services” 
Durkee, 2010 “The essential characteristics of cloud computing that address these needs are: … Pay-per-use. Much 
like a utility, cloud resource charges are based on the quantity used.” 
Foster et al., 2008 “In a cloud-based business model, a customer will pay the provider on a consumption basis, … such 
as electricity, gas, and water …” 
Gong et al., 2010 “… when a user use the storage service of cloud computing, he just pay the consuming part without 
buying any disks …” 
Grossman, 2009 “Cloud computing is usually offered with a usage-based model in which you pay for just the cloud 
resources that a particular computation requires” 
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Ibrahim et al.,2011 “Cloud computing enables users to perform their computation tasks in the public virtualized cloud using 
a pay-as-you-go style.” 
Leavitt, 2009 “…like a public utility, pay based on their usage level.” 
Mell and Grance, 2011 „Typically this is done on a pay-per-use or charge-per-use basis. “ 
Napper and Bientinesi, 
2009 
“The cloud computing model provides flexible support for ‘pay as you go’ systems” 
Schubert et al., 2010 “Pay per use. The capability to build up cost according to the actual consumption of resources is a 
relevant feature of cloud systems” 
Subashini and Kavitha, 
2011 
“The cloud offers several benefits like fast deployment, pay-for-use, lower costs…” 
Vaquero et al., 2009 “.. access to resources on a pay-per-use basis …” 
Wang and von 
Laszewski,  2008 
“…users could buy IT hardware, or even an entire data center, as a pay-as-you-go subscription ser-
vice.” 
Xu, 2012 “IaaS promotes a usage-based payment scheme, meaning that customers pay as they use.” 
Zhang et al., 2010 “Cloud computing uses a pay-as-you-go pricing model” 
Zhu et al., 2011 “The ‘pay-as-you-go’ model of a public cloud would greatly facilitate small businesses […]  they pay 
just for the computing and storage they have used …” 
 
This consensus has probably been strongly driven by the seminal and heavily cited papers by Armbrust et 
al. (2009) and Buyya et al. (2009), which predicted the development of cloud computing into a utility, 
similar to water or telephony, and is also compatible with the well-known definition of cloud computing 
that was last updated by the Mell and Grance from the National Institute of Standards & Technology 
(NIST) in 2011. 
In summary, with respect to our first research question, we conclude that pay-as-you-go is seen as the 
dominant pricing mechanism for cloud services in the literature. 
Analytical Examination of Pricing Mechanisms in the Context of IaaS 
The second part of our research focused on the analytical examination of different pricing mechanisms 
with respect to their suitability for the IaaS market. For that purpose, we identified six major pricing 
mechanisms and subsequently assessed them from the viewpoint of an IaaS provider. The results are pro-
vided in Table 2 – along with the literature sources that form the basis of our assessment – and will be 
discussed in detail in the following. 
In principal, the listed pricing mechanisms can be distinguished into two major classes, depending on the 
interaction type. For non-interactive mechanisms, prices are unilaterally set by one party – usually the 
provider of cloud services –, i.e., the other party – usually the consumer – does not have any influence on 
the price (“take it or leave it”). In contrast, with interactive schemes, the price of a service is actively nego-
tiated between the provider and consumer (Hinz and Creusen, 2009; Skiera et al., 2005). 
To start with, pay-as-you-go (also known as pay-per-use) pricing has been identified as the pricing 
scheme that is commonly associated with cloud computing in the current literature. It perfectly matches 
the “elasticity” characteristic that is connected with cloud computing in the public perception. Further-
more, pay-as-you-go pricing is characterized by its simplicity, which makes marketing the cloud products 
to consumers easier for the cloud provider. However, pay-as-you-go pricing requires extensive logging of 
the actual cloud usage through the provider. Cash flows are difficult to predict, since consumer demands 
may fluctuate over time, resulting in variable revenue streams. In addition, consumers’ willingness to pay 
may be insufficiently skimmed, since each user is charged the identical amount of money for a certain ser-
vice. Hence, the determination of an optimal price is among the key challenges in pay-as-you-go pricing, 
as is the determination of required capacities.  
Subscription models alleviate some of these problems. Since users commonly make an upfront commit-
ment, both cash flows and future capacity demands are easier to predict. This model also offers ad-
vantages with respect to customer retention, since users are less likely to switch providers once they have 
made an upfront payment. Also, similar to pay-as-you-go-pricing, subscription models are easy to under-
stand and market. However, they also lead to an insufficient skimming of consumers’ willingness to pay, 
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since prices are difficult to differentiate between different user groups. Thus, adequate price-setting can 
be challenging. Furthermore, subscription models contradict the previously mentioned “elasticity” prop-
erty of cloud computing, because consumers have to make long-term upfront commitment. 
Flatrate models can be seen as a specific flavor of subscription schemes. Since customers pay a static 
amount of money per time period and often make a long-term commitment, cash-flows can be forecast 
relatively easily. In addition, accounting is substantially easier – at least in a true flatrate model without 
usage constraints –, because the necessity to track service use is eliminated. Flatrate models are also sim-
ple to market; they further enhance customer retention, specifically when consumers have to make a long-
term commitment. Lastly, as part of the so-called flatrate bias, customers may overestimate their actual 
resource demand and hence be willing to pay a premium price for a service compared to a pay-as-you-go 
scheme. On the downside, the forecast of customer demands is difficult, and the willingness to pay may be 
insufficiently skimmed, since all consumers are offered the identical price. Hence, price-setting is also 
among the top challenges for flatrate models. Furthermore, the adequate capacitation of the infrastruc-
ture is difficult to decide; with a flatrate model, users tend to consume more resources than actually re-
quired, resulting in high resource utilization and potentially a lack of stability. 
Freemium pricing is frequently applied for digital goods, such as smartphone apps, where service provid-
ers often offer a free (limited) version and a paid (enhanced) version in the market. Freemium pricing can 
have a beneficial effect in advertising, since consumers may try out a product without any upfront pay-
ment or commitment. It hence permits customers to gain initial experience with the product, allowing 
them to assess its inherent value. Freemium pricing also allows to quickly gain a customer base, which is 
specific interest in market entry. However, since the number of consumers who are willing to switch to the 
paid version of a service is difficult to estimate, a provider faces an uncertain cash flow. In addition, free-
mium models involve the complex challenge of adequately designing the product versions, such that users 
have an incentive to switch to the paid version of the product. 
Auctions constitute a common interactive pricing scheme. Their main benefit over the previously named 
schemes is that it permits to effectively skim the consumers’ willingness to pay by differentiating prices 
between different customers (groups). However, with a multitude of different auction mechanisms being 
available, the appropriate design of the auction process constitutes a major challenge for the provider. In 
addition, auctions are inherently more complex than other pricing schemes, and thus, more difficult to 
market. In addition, since auction prices may fluctuate over time, the prediction of cash-flows is difficult 
when such model is applied. 
Lastly, reversed pricing schemes may come both in the form of interactive and non-interactive mecha-
nisms. For example, with Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP), consumers make a price suggestion to the pro-
vider, which he/she subsequently accepts or rejects. In contrast, with a Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) 
scheme, the provider will accept any offer, possibly subject to a certain pre-defined constraint. Both 
schemes may have a huge effective advertising effect, because consumers are given the ability to name a 
fair value for a service, rather than having to accept a provider-defined price. Furthermore, the consum-
ers’ willingness to pay may be more efficiently skimmed than in static schemes, at least with NYOP mech-
anisms. However, reversed pricing is more complex with respect to implementation and accounting, e.g., 
because the provider has to specify an adequate acceptance threshold in NYOP. In addition, as for all in-
teractive pricing schemes, the cash flow is difficult to predict, because the willingness to pay of consumers 
may vary over time. Also, specifically for NYOP schemes, the provider faces the challenge of keeping 
his/her acceptance threshold constantly concealed. 
In conclusion, regarding our second research question, we find that all six considered pricing have ad-
vantages and drawbacks for a cloud provider. Non-interactive pricing schemes, such as pay-as-you-go or 
subscription, are usually easy to understand and market. However, they insufficiently skim the willing-
ness to pay of the (prospective) consumers and make it challenging to set an optimal product price. In 
contrast, interactive pricing schemes promise higher revenues and permit to differentiate prices between 
consumer groups.  Yet, these mechanisms are more complex to understand and market and are difficult to 
appropriately design. 
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Table 2: Assessment of different pricing schemes from a cloud provider perspective 
Pricing 
Model 
Advantages Disadvantages Challenges 
Pay-as-you-go / 
Pay-per-use 
Simple Pricing Model (Samimi and 
Patel, 2011; Weinhardt et al., 2009) 
Optimal transformation of the 
characteristics of Cloud Computing 
(Lai, 2005; Koehler et al., 2010; 
Armbrust et al., 2010) 
Complex collection of usage (Lai, 
2005; Armbrust et al., 2010) 
Inefficient skimming of payment 
willingness (Lai, 2005) 
Cash flow difficult to predict (Lai, 
2005) 
Negative effect on customer reten-
tion 
Identification of the optimal price 
(Abhishek et. al.,2012; Lai, 2005; 
Skiera et al., 2005) 
Prediction of necessary capacities 
(Armbrust et al.,2009; Lai, 2005; 
Koehler et al., 2010) 
Subscription Simple Pricing Model (Samimi and 
Patel, 2011; Weinhardt et al., 2009) 
Simple accounting (Fishburn and 
Odlyzko, 1999) 
Necessary capacity and proceeds 
easy to predict (Fishburn and 
Odlyzko, 1999) 
Positive effect on customer reten-
tion 
Inefficient skimming of consumers’ 
willingness to pay  
Suboptimal transformation of 
cloud computing characteristics 
Identification of the optimal price 
(Lehmann and Buxmann, 2009) 
Flatrate Simple Pricing Model (Samimi and 
Patel, 2011; Odlyzko, 2000)  
Simple accounting (Fishburn and 
Odlyzko, 1999) 
“Flatrate bias”, i.e., higher willing-
ness to pay (Lehmann and Bux-
mann, 2009; Odlyzko, 2000) 
Proceeds easy to predict (Fishburn 
and Odlyzko, 1999) 
Positive effect on customer reten-
tion 
Required capacities (Odlyzko, 
2000) 
Inefficient skimming of consumers’ 
willingness to pay 
Identification of the optimal price 
(Lehmann and Buxmann, 2009) 
Lack of infrastructure stability due 
to increased usage (Odlyzko, 2000) 
Freemium Hugh effective in advertising 
Permit fast growth of the customer 
base (Anderson, 2009) 
Permits initial consumer assess-
ment of experience goods 
Cash flow difficult to predict Appropriate feature differentiation 
between the free and paid versions 
(Anderson, 2009) 
Creation of incentives to pay (An-
derson, 2009; Clement and 
Schreiber, 2010) 
Auction Effective skimming of payment 
willingness (McAfee and McMillan, 
1988; Clement and Schreiber, 
2010) 
Complex pricing model (Hinz and 
Creusen, 2009) 
Complex design process (Hinz and 
Creusen, 2009) 
Cash flow difficult to predict 
Optimal design (Hinz and Creusen, 
2009; Skiera et al., 2005) 
Explanation of the pricing model 
(Hinz and Creusen, 2009) 
Reverse Pricing Highly effective in advertising s 
(Hinz and Creusen, 2009) 
Efficient skimming of consumers’ 
willingness to pay (Shapiro and 
Zillante, 2009) 
Complex pricing model (Hinz and 
Creusen, 2009) 
Cash flow difficult to predict 
Optimal design (Shapiro and Zil-
lante, 2009; Skiera et al., 2005) 
Confidentiality of the price limit 
and the successful bids (Bernhardt 
et al., 2005) 
Empirical Study of Pricing Mechanisms in the IaaS Market 
In the third and final part of our research, we aimed to complement our analytical findings with empirical 
data from the IaaS market. Our focus was not on the actual prices for specific resource types, but on the 
pricing schemes and mechanisms that are applied. For the study, we initially determined a set of 48 dif-
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ferent IaaS providers using Google, based on common search terms such as “cloud”, “cloud computing”, 
“IaaS”, and “provider”.  
For each provider, we identified and stored any artifacts that contained statements on pricing, such as 
Web pages or terms of service. It should be noted that our study focused on publicly available pricing in-
formation; hence, providers may offer different pricing schemes as part of bilateral negotiations with (ma-
jor) customers. 
An overview of all considered providers, along with their online addresses, can be found in Table 3 in the 
annex. Since our sample includes a large number of providers – both major players and small-and-
medium-sized companies – we believe that it constitutes a representative picture of the IaaS market.  
Nevertheless, limitations may arise from our previously described search procedure, which was based on 
Google: First, Google’s index may be incomplete, i.e., certain providers may not be (prominently) listed; 
second, our search terms may be inadequate to identify all providers of interest. 
Figure 1 shows the pricing mechanisms that were found among the considered providers. As can be seen, 
pay-as-you-go pricing is the dominant scheme and used by essentially all providers in our sample. How-
ever, subscription and freemium models are also widely applied, usually as a complement to pay-as-you-
go pricing. A prominent example for this situation is Amazon Web Services’ Elastic Compute Cloud, which 
offers a freemium-style Free Tier, pay-as-you-go On-Demand Instances, subscription-based Reserved 
Instances, and auction-based Spot Instances. Interestingly, Amazon is also the only provider in our sam-
ple to apply an interactive pricing scheme, i.e., auctioning. However, as Agmon Ben-Yehuda et al. (2011) 
point out in their work, that system is very likely not market-driven, indicating a low interest by consum-
ers in auctioning schemes for IaaS resources. 
Based on the previous results, we further examined the commitment periods for each distinct offer. By 
commitment period, we refer to the minimum period of time for which a user will be billed when a specif-
ic provider and pricing model is chosen. For example, in the case of Amazon Web Services’ On-Demand 
Instances, a minimum period of one hour will be charged, regardless if the user terminates a VM instance 
prior to that period. In contrast, with Reserved Instances, a user will have to make a commitment for ei-
ther one or three years and pay a corresponding fixed upfront fee, which subsequently results in lower 
variable operating costs per hour. 
The results of this second part of our empirical study are provided in Figure 2. As can be seen, in conjunc-
tion with a pay-as-you-go pricing scheme, most IaaS providers seem to follow the example of Amazon 
Web Services, arguably of the pioneers in the cloud market, which uses a one-hour commitment period 
for its On-Demand Instances. However, a small number of providers also offer more fine-granular com-
mitment periods in the order of magnitude of minutes or even seconds. Such shorter periods may be ad-
vantageous to certain user groups when resources are only leased for very brief time periods, e.g., in order 
to handle burst loads. 
In contrast, many providers also use longer commitment periods in the order of magnitude of months or 
years, mostly in conjunction with subscription models. As the previously mentioned example of Amazon 
Web Services’ Reserved Instances demonstrates, such models may be advantageous to a user if he/she 
continuously requires und actually exploits resources. However, it also contradicts the prevalent notion of 
high elasticity that is commonly associated with cloud computing (Mell and Grance, 2011), because costs 
will also accrue if instances are not actively used by the consumer. 
In summary, concerning the third research question, we find that pay-as-you-go and subscription models 
are the pre-dominant pricing scheme in the IaaS market today. Thus, the empirical evidence largely sup-
ports the consensual literature view on cloud pricing that has been identified in the second section of this 
paper. However, due to the prevalence of commitment periods – most commonly in the order of magni-
tude of hours with pay-as-you-go models and months for subscription-based models –, pricing does not 
scale perfectly linear with the actual resource usage. 
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Figure 1: Applied pricing mechanisms among the 
considered IaaS providers (sample size n = 48; mul-
tiple options may apply for a single provider) 
Sec. Min. Hour Day Mon. Year
Auction 0 0 1 0 0 0
Freemium 0 1 4 4 5 1
Subscription 0 0 6 1 18 7
Pay-as-you-go 2 4 29 1 12 1
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Figure 2: Minimum commitment periods by order 
of magnitude across all pricing mechanisms among 
the considered IaaS providers (sample size n = 48; 
multiple options may apply for a single provider) 
Conclusions 
Cloud computing has revived the decade-old vision of providing IT resources in a utility-like, flexible fash-
ion. With the growing maturity of the cloud market and the increasing standardization of products – spe-
cifically in the Infrastructure as a Service domain – lock-in effects diminish, and adequate pricing be-
comes a crucial success factor for cloud providers. 
In this work, we examined three different aspects of pricing in infrastructure clouds: First, we examined 
the scientific perspective, based on a literature review. Second, we analytically assessed a set of popular 
pricing schemes with respect to their pros and cons when applied in the IaaS market. Third, we empirical-
ly examined the relevance of these pricing mechanisms, based on a sample of 48 IaaS providers. 
Our results indicate that cloud computing is generally associated with a pay-as-you-go scheme in the cur-
rent literature. Yet, our analytical study indicates that other, interactive pricing schemes – such as auc-
tions – may be more advantageous from the standpoint of a cloud provider in practice, since they permit 
to differentiate prices between customers and more effectively skim the respective willingness to pay. 
However, such schemes are also more complex to appropriately design and market. Lastly, our empirical 
study has revealed that non-interactive pricing schemes – namely, pay-as-you-go and subscription – are 
the most widespread mechanisms in practice today. In this respect, our findings partially confirm the 
prevalent literature view on pricing in cloud computing. 
However, based on our empirical study, we believe that cloud computing – at least as far as IaaS is con-
cerned – should be seen as a model that permits access to a pool of compute capacity not only based on 
pay-as-you-go pricing schemes, but also based on subscription schemes. In this respect, cloud computing 
bears more resemblance with traditional Web server leasing than is conveyed by the established literature 
view. In addition, our research has demonstrated that interactive pricing only accounts for a minority of 
the market, even though such pricing mechanisms offer potential advantages, most notably the ability to 
more effectively skim consumers’ willingness to pay. 
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Annex 
Table 3: List of IaaS providers considered in the empirical study 
IaaS Provider Name Online Address 
Amazon AWS http://aws.amazon.com/ 
AT&T https://www.synaptic.att.com/ 
Atlantic http://www.atlantic.net/cloud-hosting/ 
Bitrefinery http://bitrefinery.com/ 
Cartika http://www.cartika.com/ 
Cloud Provider http://www.cloudprovider.net/ 
CloudSigma http://www.cloudsigma.com/ 
DomainFactory http://www.df.eu/ 
Elastichosts http://www.elastichosts.com/ 
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Exoscale http://www.exoscale.ch/ 
Flexiscale http://www.flexiscale.com/ 
Fujitsu http://welcome.globalcloud.global.fujitsu.com/ 
Gandi https://www.gandi.net/hosting/iaas 
Gigenet https://gigenet.com/cloud-servers/ 
GoGrid https://www.gogrid.com/products/cloud-servers 
Google https://cloud.google.com/products/compute-engine/ 
HP Cloud http://www.hpcloud.com/ 
Iland Internet Solutions http://www.iland.com/ 
Incloudibly https://incloudibly.com/en/cloud 
Internap http://www.internap.com 
Itenos http://www.itenos.de/ 
Joyent http://www.joyent.com/products/compute-service/ 
Leaseweb http://www.leaseweb.com/en/cloud-hosting/ 
LieCloud http://www.liecloud.com 
Linode https://www.linode.com/ 
Logicworks https://cloud.logicworks.net/ 
Lufthansa Systems https://cloud.lhsystems.com/ 
Lunacloud http://www.lunacloud.com/en/cloud-server 
M5 Cloud Hosting http://www.m5cloud.com/ 
MK Cloud https://www.mk.de/ 
Nephoscale http://nephoscale.com/cloud-servers/ 
OmniNet http://www.omninet.co.nz/cloud-services/cloud-servers 
OpSource http://www.opsource.net/Services/Cloud-Hosting/Cloud-Servers 
Peer1Hosting http://www.peer1hosting.co.uk/cloud-hosting/ 
Poundhost http://www.poundhost.com/cloud-servers 
Profitbricks http://www.profitbricks.de/ 
Rackspace http://www.rackspace.com/ 
Rootaxcess http://www.rootaxcess.com/cloud-server 
Savvisdirect http://www.savvisdirect.com/cloud-servers/ 
Servermule http://www.servermule.com.au/ 
Softlayer http://www.softlayer.com/cloudlayer/computing 
Storm https://www.stormondemand.com/servers/ 
Strato https://www.strato-pro.com/ger/server-cloud/ 
Terremark http://vcloudexpress.terremark.com/ 
vServerCenter http://www.vservercenter.com/ 
Windows Azure http://www.windowsazure.com/ 
Zettagrid https://www.zettagrid.com/services/cloud-servers/ 
Zunicore https://www.zunicore.com/ 
 
